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 ABSTRACT 
The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity 
by Philippe Aghion, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, Peter Howitt, Susanne 
Prantl 
How does firm entry affect innovation incentives in incumbent firms? Micro data 
suggest that there is heterogeneity across industries. Specifically, incumbent 
productivity growth and patenting is positively correlated with lagged greenfield 
foreign firm entry in technologically advanced industries, but not in laggard 
industries. To explain this pattern, we use a Schumpeterian growth model with 
entry and multiple sectors which differ by their distance to the world technology 
frontier. We show that technologically advanced entry threat spurs innovation 
incentives in sectors close to the technology frontier - successful innovation 
allows incumbents to survive the threat. In laggard sectors it discourages 
innovation - increased entry threat reduces incumbents' expected rents from 
innovating. We find that the empirical patterns hold using rich micro panel data 
for the UK, and controlling for the endogeneity of entry by exploiting major 
European and UK policy reforms. 
 
 
 
Keywords:  entry threat, innovation incentives, distance to the technology frontier, firm 
entry, productivity growth, patenting 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity 
Wie wirkt Markteintritt auf Innovationsanreize? Deskriptive Auswertungen von 
Mikrodaten zeigen industriespezifische Heterogenität in den Reaktionen 
etablierter Unternehmen. Konkret zeigt sich, dass das Produktivitätswachstum 
und die Patentzahlen etablierter Unternehmen in technologisch hoch-
entwickelten Industrien positiv korrelieren mit vorhergehendem Markteintritt 
ausländischer Unternehmen, die neue Produktionseinheiten aufbauen. Dies 
steht im Gegensatz zur Situation in Industrien, die hinter dem technisch 
Machbaren zurückbleiben. Um dieses Muster zu erklären, verwenden wir ein 
endogenes Wachstumsmodell mit Markteintritt und multiplen Sektoren in 
unterschiedlicher Distanz von der weltweit geltenden, technologischen 
Entwicklungsgrenze. Markteintrittsdruck seitens technologisch fortschrittlicher 
Unternehmen erhöht die Innovationsanreize etablierter Unternehmen in 
Sektoren nahe der technologischen Entwicklungsgrenze, da etablierte 
Unternehmen dort durch erfolgreiche Innovationstätigkeit drohenden 
Markteintritt überleben können. In technologisch rückständigen Industrien 
reduziert Markteintrittsdruck die im Erfolgsfalle zu erwartende Innovationsrente 
etablierter Unternehmen und dämpft somit deren Innovationsanreize. Wir 
zeigen empirische Evidenz, die im Einklang mit diesen 
Kausalzusammenhängen steht. Für die empirische Analyse verwenden wir 
umfassende Paneldaten auf Mikroebene in Großbritannien und wir nutzen 
wichtige Politikänderungen auf EU-Ebene und in Großbritannien, um für die 
Endogenität von Markteintritt zu kontrollieren. 
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1 Introduction
There is a long standing interest in the eﬀects of firm entry, which are widely recognized
as major drivers of economic growth. Entry can induce reallocation of inputs and outputs,
trigger knowledge spillovers and aﬀect innovation incentives in incumbent firms. Entry by
foreign firms has been a focus of attention in recent years, particularly in countries or in-
dustries behind the technological frontier, and has spurred widespread policy reforms aimed
at fostering the free movement of goods, services, capital and firm management. Empir-
ical studies on the eﬀects of market liberalizations and foreign direct investment provide,
however, mixed results on incumbent reactions.1 In this paper we take a new look at this
issue. We combine theoretical and empirical analysis to investigate a major source of sys-
tematic heterogeneity in foreign firm entry eﬀects on incumbent innovation incentives and
productivity growth across industries, time and economic environments.
We are motivated by the following empirical regularity - we see substantial heterogeneity
in the eﬀects of foreign firm entry on average incumbent total factor productivity (TFP)
growth when we look across industries in the United Kingdom (UK). In some industries
entry has a strongly positive eﬀect, while in others it seems to depress incumbent TFP
growth. Positive eﬀects are found in technologically advanced industries, and weak or even
negative ones in technologically laggard industries. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where
we plot the foreign entry rate in an industry at time t− 1 against the average TFP growth
estimate for incumbent establishments in that industry at time t. The sample is split at the
median distance to the technological frontier, as measured on the industry level by relative
US-UK labor productivity.2
[Figure 1 here]
This finding of heterogeneous entry eﬀects is compelling, but we find no ready explanation
1See, inter alia, Aitken and Harrison (1999), Pavcnik (2002) and Javorcik (2004) and the literature cited
there.
2See notes below figure 1 and section 4 for a description of the data and variables used here.
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in the theoretical literature. Our contribution in this paper is first to discuss in detail a
theoretical explanation that is consistent with this form of heterogeneity, then to explore
the robustness of the finding using micro panel data, and paying particular attention to the
problem of entry endogeneity in incumbent performance equations.
Our theoretical explanation comes from a multi-sector Schumpeterian growth model with
entry threat that aﬀects the innovative eﬀort by incumbent firms in a systematically diﬀerent
way according to the initial state of technological development in the industry. We focus
on technologically advanced entry in the theoretical part of the paper, which accords well
with our foreign firm entry measure in Figure 1, since firms that operate internationally are
more likely to produce at the technological frontier.3 A main implication of the model is that
higher threat of technologically advanced entry should encourage innovation by incumbents in
sectors that are initially close to the technological frontier. This escape-entry eﬀect is similar
to the escape-competition eﬀect analyzed in Aghion et al. (2001, 2005a). Incumbents that are
further behind the frontier have no hope to win against a potential entrant, and therefore the
eﬀect of an increased entry threat is to reduce the incumbents’ expected payoﬀ from investing
in R&D. This discouragement eﬀect is similar to the Schumpeterian appropriability eﬀect
of product market competition. The eﬀects of entry on incumbent productivity growth in
sectors near and further behind the technological frontier mirror the heterogeneous pattern
of entry eﬀects on innovation incentives.
The descriptive evidence provided in Figure 1 is of course not suﬃcient to establish a
causal relationship from entry to incumbent performance, measured by innovative activity
or productivity growth. The entry threat variable used in the theoretical model is not
observable, and it is endogenous in incumbent performance equations, as we show in greater
detail in the paper. Using, as we do, actual entry as a proxy for entry threat, only worsens
the endogeneity problem.4 To deal with this we exploit as instruments the large number of
3See section 4.2 for details.
4The reason is that actual entry deviates from entry threat only in situations where entrants may lose
against incumbents and the diﬀerence between entry threat and actual entry then depends again on incum-
bent performance in form of innovative activity.
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policy interventions that substantially changed the conditions for foreign entry in the UK
during the 1980s and 1990s in diﬀerent industries at diﬀerent times. The instruments we use
are shown to have a strong influence on foreign entry, conditional on other covariates in the
model such as competition and trade. To measure actual entry of foreign firms and separate
it out from domestic firm entry for a large number of 4-digit manufacturing industries we can
use rich panel data on the population of manufacturing plants and their ownership. We link
US and UK data to identify industries that are near or further away from the technological
frontier and control for endogeneity of the distance to frontier using US technology and
production information as additional instruments. We complement our productivity growth
analysis by investigating entry eﬀects on incumbent firms’ patenting behavior, which is a
more direct measure of innovative eﬀorts. Also, we consider the eﬀects of domestic entry on
incumbent performance, and relate these to our theoretical analysis. Finally, we argue why
the two most likely alternative explanations based on knowledge spillovers do not explain
the full pattern of our empirical findings.
Our theoretical analysis relates to several papers in the theoretical IO literature, in
particular Gilbert and Newbery (1982) on preemption, and Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) on
the regulation of entry. Laﬀont and Tirole analyze the welfare eﬀects of entry regulation in
a model of product diﬀerentiation. However, they do not allow for incumbent innovation,
and concentrate instead on how entry regulation aﬀects the size of innovations, or the extent
of diﬀerentiation, by newly entering firms. Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Tirole (1988)
analyze the strategic interaction between entrants and incumbents. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) and Aghion et al. (2005a) focus on competition among incumbent firms and its eﬀects
on growth, but they do not consider entry. Recent theory papers focussing on reallocative
eﬀects of entry and trade liberalization reforms are Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003).
In contrast, this paper focuses on the way in which entry eﬀects growth through within-firm
innovation eﬀects in incumbents.
Our empirical analysis relates to several diﬀerent strands of empirical work. First, there
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is the empirical literature on the eﬀects of trade liberalization and foreign direct investment.
Studies including Aitken and Harrison (1999), Pavcnik (2002), and Javorcik (2004) are, as
ours, based on plant or firm data and exploit variation of trade and entry across industries
and time.5 Second, there is an empirical IO literature, following the work of Bresnahan and
Reiss (1990, 1991) and Berry (1992).6 The emphasis in these papers is on entry in well de-
fined, oligopolistic markets and on endogeneity of market structure. Olley and Pakes (1996)
investigate the eﬀects of deregulation on aggregate productivity growth and the underlying
reallocation mechanism in one particular industry. We focus instead on the heterogeneity
in entry eﬀects on incumbent innovation and productivity growth across markets. Another
related strand is the literature on product market competition, firm performance and inno-
vation, in particular Nickell (1996), Blundell et al. (1999), and Aghion et al. (2005a).
More directly linked to this paper, Aghion et. al. (2004) analyze entry eﬀects on av-
erage incumbent productivity growth and show that industries with higher changes of the
employment share in foreign firms experience, on average, higher growth of total factor pro-
ductivity in incumbents. Aghion and Griﬃth (2005) provide a summary of recent theoretical
and empirical literature on competition, entry and growth.
Our result that entry threat has positive eﬀects on incumbent innovation incentives and
productivity growth in industries initially close to the technological frontier, but not in those
industries that are initially further behind the frontier, has direct implications for the policy
debate on market (de)regulation, competition policy, large scale privatization, and trade
liberalization. This debate underlies the consideration of costs and benefits of globalization
and the discussion on entry regulation in diﬀerent countries and industries.7 What our
analysis suggests is that policies aiming at decreasing or removing entry barriers alone may
5Plant or firm level data is also used by Bertschek (1995), Griﬃth et al. (2002), Haskel et al. (2002),
Keller and Yeaple (2004). Aghion et al. (2005b) rely on industry level panel data to analyze the unequalizing
eﬀects of delicensing reforms on manufacturing industry performance across states in India.
6Recent examples are, among others, Mazzeo (2002) and Seim (2004). Berry and Pakes (2003) provide
an excellent overview.
7Djankov et al. (2002), for example, present comparative data on direct entry regulation in 85 countries.
Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) look at employment eﬀects of entry regulation in the French retail industry.
See also Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2004).
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not be suﬃcient to foster productivity growth of incumbent firms in all industries, even
when such policies can be shown to be growth-enhancing on average. This, in turn, may
suggest complementary policies to facilitate the reallocation of factors and resources from
less to more technologically developed industries that react more positively to entry threat.
Regulation that inhibits such reallocation should be reduced.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we sketch the key elements of the theoreti-
cal model; further theoretical analysis is provided in section 5.3 and Appendix A. We specify
the empirical models in section 3 and describe data and variable construction in section 4.
Empirical results are presented in section 5 and in section 6 we conclude.
2 A theoretical explanation for heterogeneity in entry
eﬀects
To explain the heterogeneous entry eﬀects illustrated in Figure 1 we introduce technologically
advanced entry into a multi-sector Schumpeterian growth model.8 The model implies that
higher entry threat has a positive eﬀect on economic performance of incumbent firms in
sectors that are initially close to the technological frontier, whereas it may damage the
performance of firms in sectors that are initially further behind the frontier.
2.1 Basic model
In each period t a final good, henceforth the numéraire, is produced under perfect competition
using a continuum of intermediate inputs, according to the technology:
yt =
Z 1
0
At (i)
1−α xt (i)
α di, α ∈ (0, 1), (1)
where xt (i) denotes the quantity of the intermediate input produced in sector i and At (i)
is the productivity parameter associated with the latest version of that input.
For each intermediate product there are two firms capable of producing an innovation.
Intermediate producers live for only one period, and property rights over their technological
8A simplified version of this model with a fixed probability p of entry is sketched in Aghion et al. (2004)
and in Aghion and Griﬃth (2005).
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capabilities are transmitted within dynasties. The final good is used as capital in the produc-
tion of intermediate goods with a one-for-one technology. We assume Bertrand competition
within each intermediate sector.
In any sector where both firms have access to the same technology, Bertrand competition
implies zero profits. In any sector where one firm (the “leader”) has a better technology
than the other (the “laggard”), only the leader will actively produce. As shown in Zilibotti
et al. (2005), the equilibrium profit for each leader takes the form:
πt(i) = δAt (i) , δ = (1− α)α
1+α
1−α . (2)
2.2 Technological states, innovation, and entry
The world’s “technological frontier” at the end of each period t is characterized by a tech-
nology parameter At which grows at the exogenous rate γ − 1 > 0:
A¯t = γA¯t−1.
At the beginning of period t intermediate firms can be of three types. Firms of type 1
operate at the current frontier, with a productivity level At−1 (i) = A¯t−1. Type-2 firms are
one step behind the frontier, with At−1 (i) = A¯t−2, and type-3 firms are two steps behind,
with At−1 (i) = A¯t−3.
Innovation allows an incumbent firm to increase its productivity by the factor γ and
thereby to keep up with growth of the frontier.9 The cost of technology adoption is quadratic
in its hazard rate and also proportional to the targeted level of productivity. More specifically,
by incurring a cost
cjt = c ·
¡
z2/2
¢
A¯t−j, c > 0,
9The assumption of “step-by-step” technological progress is made here for the sake of tractability. As in
Aghion et al. (2001), this assumption avoids having to deal with asymmetries in the decision problems of
firms at diﬀerent distances from the technological frontier. If we allowed innovating type-2 firms to catch
up with the frontier with suﬃciently high probability the discouragement eﬀect of entry on type-2 firms
would turn into an escape-entry eﬀect. In that case, our model would predict higher rates of innovation and
productivity growth for type-2 firms than for type-1 firms, a prediction which is not borne by our data and
empirical analysis.
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at the beginning of period t, a type-j incumbent, where j ∈ {1, 2}, can increase its productiv-
ity with probability z by the factor γ within that period, adopting the next most productive
technology. With probability 1− z the incumbent’s productivity does not increase, and lags
by j+1 steps behind the new frontier. The most backward (type-3) firms are automatically
upgraded by the factor γ as in Aghion et al. (1997). This reflects the idea that the cost of
technological adoption becomes negligible for suﬃciently mature technologies.
In each period and intermediate sector, there is one outside producer that can pay for
an entry opportunity. We focus on technologically advanced entry; thus when entry occurs
it takes place at the new frontier A¯t.10 An entrant will steal all the market and become the
new leading firm unless the incumbent leader also has the frontier technology At after the
innovation process described above, in which case we assume that the incumbent retains the
entire market.11
Note that incumbent laggards will never invest in innovation, because an innovation
would at best allow the firm to catch up to its rival and would still leave the firm with
zero profits. Note also that in steady state there are no intermediate sectors in which the
incumbents are both type-1 or both type-2. This is because such a (“level”) sector would
have to have been level in the previous period, since non-innovating laggards never catch up
to their leader, whereas innovation and entry will eventually unlevel the sector.
Thus, in the long run, all intermediate sectors will be in one of only three possible “states”
at the beginning of any period: (a) state-1 sectors are those with a type-1 leader; (b) state-
2 sectors are those with a type-2 leader and (c) state-3 sectors are those with two type-3
10More generally, one can think of several potential entrants with heterogeneous and a priori uncertain
productivities, who are racing for entry into a particular industry. As long as at least one potential entrant
has a high productivity realization At, the analysis and comparative static results will remain the same as if
we assume only one potential entrant with productivity At. See section 5.3.2 for a discussion of other forms
of entry.
11Aghion et al. (2005c) use the following sequential game between incumbent firms and potential entrants
to provide foundations for this assumption. The entrant must pay a small entry fee to enter and can decide
whether to pay this fee after observing the post-innovation technology of the incumbent. Assuming that
Bertrand competition takes place after entry, the entrant will find it profitable to pay the entry fee and
appropriate the local market if the incumbent is expected to lag behind the entrant. If the incumbent is,
instead, expected to compete on an equal footing with the entrant, then the entrant will find it optimal not
to pay the entry fee.
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incumbents.
2.3 Equilibrium innovation
Consider the R&D decisions of incumbent leaders in state-1 and state-2 sectors.12 Denote
by pj the probability that the potential entrant pays the cost of entry in a state-j sector.
This probability depends negatively upon a common entry cost parameter Λ: p0j(Λ) < 0 (see
Appendix A.1).
• A state-2 leader, with At−1 (i) = A¯t−2, chooses its investment z to maximize the ex-
pected net profit gain from innovation minus the R&D eﬀort cost, that is:
max
z
{δz (1− p2) A¯t−1 − c
¡
z2/2
¢
A¯t−2},
from which the first order condition yields:
z = (δ/c) (1− p2) γ = z2.
In words, the type-2 leader only retains the market if it successfully innovates and
there is no entry (i.e. with probability z(1 − p2)). If it does not innovate then its
automatically upgraded type-3 rival catches up with it, and Bertrand competition
between the two neck-and-neck firms dissipates all profits.
• A state-1 leader, with At−1 (i) = A¯t−1, chooses its innovative investment to:
max
z
{δ £zA¯t + (1− z) (1− p1)A¯t−1¤− c ¡z2/2¢ A¯t−1}.
Hence, from the first order condition we get:
z = (δ/c) (γ − 1 + p1) = z1.
In words, the type-1 leader retains the market when: (i) it successfully innovates or
(ii) it does not successfully innovate and there is no entry.
12Recall that laggards do not innovate and type-3 firms are automatically upgraded without investing.
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2.4 The “escape entry” and “discouragement” eﬀects
Now consider the eﬀects of increasing entry threat on innovative activity, which we here
model as a reduction in the entry cost parameter Λ. In state-3 sectors an increase in the
entry threat has no eﬀect on innovation investments, since those are always equal to zero.
Now, consider what happens in state-2 and state-1 sectors:
• In state-2 sectors, a reduction in Λ that increases the entry threat p2(Λ), reduces the
expected payoﬀ from innovating and therefore “discourages” innovation. Firms further
behind the frontier know that they cannot survive entry, even if they successfully
innovate. That is:
∂z2
∂Λ
= − (δ/c) γp02(Λ) > 0. (3)
This discouragement eﬀect is similar to the Schumpeterian appropriability eﬀect of
product market competition pointed out, for example, in Aghion et al. (2001, 2005a).
• In state-1 sectors, a reduction in Λ that increases the entry threat p1(Λ), fosters inno-
vation as it increases the incumbent leaders’ losses from entry if they do not innovate,
thereby increasing their incentive to “escape entry” by innovating. That is:
∂z1
∂Λ
= (δ/c) p01(Λ) < 0. (4)
This escape-entry eﬀect is similar to the escape-competition eﬀect pointed out in
Aghion et al. (2001, 2005a).
Together with the fact that laggards never innovate, this implies that an increase in the
threat of entry discourages innovation in a state-2 sector and encourages it in a state-1 sector.
Expected productivity growth in either sector is proportional to innovative investment:
E
∙µ
At (i)−At−1 (i)
At−1 (i)
¶
|At−1(i) = At−j
¸
= zj(γ − 1) = gj, j ∈ {1, 2}. (5)
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Therefore a reduction in entry cost Λ has a positive escape-entry eﬀect on incumbent pro-
ductivity growth in state-1 sectors, and a negative discouragement eﬀect in state-2 sectors:13
dg1
dΛ
=
dz1
dΛ
(γ − 1) < 0; dg2
dΛ
=
dz2
dΛ
(γ − 1) > 0.
2.5 Empirical implications
In summary, the main empirical implications that we draw from the theory are:
• Increasing the threat of entry has a positive eﬀect on incumbent innovation in sectors
that are close to the technological frontier and a possibly negative eﬀect in sectors that
are further behind the frontier.
• Increasing the threat of entry has a more positive eﬀect on incumbent productivity
growth in sectors that are closer to the technological frontier than in sectors that are
further behind the frontier.
3 Empirical specification
The implications derived above explain a heterogeneous pattern of entry eﬀects on incum-
bent performance along the distance to technological frontier. The descriptive evidence in
Figure 1, however, is not suﬃcient to establish a causal relationship. The central empirical
relationship that we want to explore is of the form:
Y = f (P,D,X) , (6)
where Y is a measure of incumbent performance, P is entry threat, D is the distance to
the technological frontier, and X is a vector of further covariates. These covariates may
determine the performance of incumbents in addition to entry - most important, we think of
13In state-3 sectors an increased entry threat does not aﬀect the rate of productivity growth. Being
upgraded with probability one, both firms in such sectors grow at the same constant rate γ − 1. Thus:
g3 = γ − 1,
and a reduction in entry cost Λ has no eﬀect on productivity growth.
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eﬀects triggered by trade relations and other factors that aﬀect competition, market structure
and the rents of incumbents.
Our main measure of incumbent performance is growth of total factor productivity
(∆TFPijt) measured on establishment level. To bring equation (6) to the data we spec-
ify the relation between incumbent TFP growth and entry as
∆TFPijt = α+ β1Ejt−1 + β2Djt−1 + β3Ejt−1Djt−1 +X
0
ijt−1γ + τ t + ηi + uijt. (7)
where i indexes incumbent establishments, j indexes industries, and t indexes years. While
entry threat P is unobservable, actual entry E and variables aﬀecting entry costs Λ can
be observed. We use lagged actual entry Ejt−1 directly in equation (7) and instrument it
with policy reforms that change entry costs Λ building on the following economic reasoning.
If entry threat were observable and we could use it directly in equation (7) it would be
potentially endogenous, i.e. depend on incumbent innovation that triggers productivity
growth (see equation (11) in Appendix A.2). When using observable actual entry as proxy
for entry threat we face the same problem, only in aggravated form. Actual entry deviates
from entry threat in situations where entrants may lose against incumbents, that is, in our
context, in industries close to the frontier. In industries further behind the frontier, where
entrants can never lose against incumbents, actual entry and entry threat are identical (see
equation (13)). If entry threat and actual entry diﬀer, then the diﬀerence depends again
on incumbent innovative activity (see equation (14)). It can be shown that entry threat
correlates positively with actual entry as long as incumbent innovation aiming at escaping
entry is not too successful in the sense of entry prevention to outweigh the direct positive
eﬀect of entry threat on actual entry (see Appendix A.2).
Due to the described endogeneity problem we expect a negative covariance between actual
entry and the error term in incumbent performance equations. Including establishment-
specific fixed eﬀects and time eﬀects is unlikely to be suﬃcient to address the endogeneity
issue, since industry-specific, time-varying changes of incumbent performance should aﬀect
actual entry. Even using a lagged entry measure, as we do, may not fully solve the problem.
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Our preferred approach is to control for endogeneity by using selected policy reforms as
instrumental variables (IV). We argue that these reforms changed entry costs and eﬀected
entry threat as well as actual entry diﬀerentially across industries and time but, conditional
on all other covariates in the model, do not eﬀect TFP growth or innovation. The policy
instruments include time-varying indicators of the implementation of the EU Single Market
Program (SMP) in industries with medium or high entry barriers that were likely to be
reduced by the SMP, competition investigations by the UK Competition Authority that
culminated in entry-inducing remedies, and large scale privatizations.14
Potential endogeneity of the distance to the technological frontier is also a concern since
any assumption we impose on that variable can directly aﬀect findings on heterogeneous
entry eﬀects along the distance to frontier. To address this issue we use US technology and
production information as additional instruments.15
Our preferred specification of equation (7) includes linear terms of the entry and distance
to frontier measures, as well as their continuous interaction term. We show that our results
are robust to using alternative functional forms in section 5 (specifically, interacting entry
with discrete distance to frontier indicators). To control for diﬀerent permanent levels of
TFP growth across establishments we include individual fixed eﬀects ηi. Common macro
shocks are captured by time dummies τ t.
A concern about using TFP growth in incumbent establishments in our context is that
it may not only reflect firms’ innovative activity, but also advances due to imitation of
entrants with superior technology or reallocation within establishments. To check whether
our TFP growth results are likely to pick up actual changes in firms’ innovative activity we
also estimate patent count models to complement our TFP growth estimations. We specify
the innovation rate as
nijt = e
α+β1Ejt−1+β2Djt−1+β3Ejt−1Djt−1+X0ijt−1γ+τ t+ηi , (8)
14A full description of the policy instruments are given in Table B.1, App. B.
15Summary statistics on these variables can be found in Table B.4, App. B.
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where i indexes incumbent firms, j indexes industries, and t indexes years. The patent
process is assumed to follow a flexible negative binomial distribution with hazard rate nijt.
All other variables and parameters are defined as in equation (7), and the specification is
similar. To take unobservable firm-specific, time-invariant heterogeneity in patent behavior
into account we follow Blundell et al. (1999) and use pre-sample information on firms’
knowledge stocks.
In the linear model in (7) we apply IV estimation that involves three first stage regressions:
one for the linear entry term, one for the distance term as well as one for their interaction.
In the non-linear case of (8) we use the control function approach to control for endogeneity.
This approach consists of including the three first-stage residual terms in the regression
equation.16
Our identification strategy rests on using actual entry directly in equations (7) and (8) and
instrumenting it with policy interventions that aﬀected the ease and cost underlying entry
threat and actual entry, and did so diﬀerentially across industries and time. For example,
the aims of the SMP were to bring down EU internal barriers to the free movement of goods,
services, capital and labor by interventions such as harmonizing product standards, indirect
taxes and border controls, removing national requirements and other non-tariﬀ barriers that
enable firms to segment markets and limit competition, removing public sector discrimination
in favor of its own firms, reducing capital and labor costs by permitting free flow across
countries. The interventions may also aﬀect innovation incentives and productivity growth
through other channels, especially through changing the competitive environment. Thus,
we pay careful attention to controlling for measures of competition and import penetration,
and argue that the entry instruments have no additional impact on innovation and TFP
growth, after we condition on these covariates. We test the overidentification assumptions
and experiment with using only subsets of these instruments. In section 5 our results are
shown to be robust to these specification checks.
16In linear models, control function and IV coeﬃcient estimates coincide. See Wooldridge (2002), Chapter
18 or Blundell and Powell (2003).
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4 Data
We combine micro-level data from several sources. To measure entry we use data on the
population of manufacturing plants in Great Britain provided by the UK Oﬃce for National
Statistics (ONS) in connection with the Annual Respondents Database (ARD). The ARD
is the most comprehensive establishment-level dataset for Great Britain and is collected by
the ONS under the 1947 Statistical Trade Act. This makes it a legal obligation for firms to
report. Time-varying ownership information allows us to quantify firm entry into the UK
at the 4-digit industry level. To measure growth of total factor productivity we can use
information on output and inputs for the random stratified ARD sample of establishments
from the population.17
We also use firm-level accounting data from DataStream that is matched to patent data
from the NBER/Case Western Patent database for a sample of firms listed on the London
Stock Exchange (LSE). Using data on patents at the US Patent Oﬃce has the advantage of
focusing on major patents by UK firms, since their low value patents are usually not taken
out in the US. The firms in our sample account for a large proportion of UK R&D activity.18
4.1 Total factor productivity growth and innovation
To calculate TFP growth we apply a standard factor share approach, use superlative index
measurement (Caves et al. 1982a, b), and data from the ARD on output and inputs of
establishments in 180 4-digit manufacturing industries between 1987 and 1993. We pay
attention to a number of potential measurement errors in TFP (see Appendix B) and present
results using two alternative TFP growth measures as well as labor productivity growth. We
also consider a patent count variable as an additional measure of performance. The data set
on firms listed on the LSE and their patenting activity at the US Patent Oﬃce covers 60
diﬀerent 3-digit manufacturing industries between 1987 and 1993.
17About 76 percent of all sampled establishments between 1980 and 1993 are single plants, all others
represent groups of on average 1.6 plants operating in the same 4-digit industry and owned by the same firm.
18See also Appendix B on data sources.
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4.2 Entry
When calculating entry measures we can distinguish between foreign firm and domestic firm
entry. Our measure for technologically advanced entry as focussed on in the theory section
is the foreign firm entry rate. We choose foreign entry since it is from firms that operate
internationally and most likely produce at the technological frontier. Moreover, foreign firm
entry is an important form of entry in the UK during the 1980s and 1990s. Inflows of foreign
direct investment were substantial during that period, and the employment share in foreign
owned manufacturers rose from 9.97 in 1980 to 16.14 percent in 1993. We define the foreign
firm entry rate as the share of industry employment that is in foreign firms entering the
respective British industry for the first time with a newly set-up production facility:
Ejt =
PNjt
i=1 Lit ∗Dijt(new facility; owner = foreign, new)PNjt
i=1 Lit
, (9)
where Lit is the number of employees in plant i in year t. The function D (.) equals one
if a foreign firm enters industry j with a new plant in year t and does not own any older
plants in industry j, and zero otherwise.19 The denominator is the number of employees in
all plants in industry j at time t. For the productivity growth models we use the measure
at the 4-digit industry level (SIC code) and for the patent count models at the 3-digit SIC
code level.
The domestic firm entry rate is calculated in a similar manner and its eﬀects on incumbent
productivity growth and patenting activity are investigated in section 5.3.2.
Our entry measures capture the size of foreign or domestic entry and thus go beyond
simply counting entrants or simply considering all entering firms in one measure. The foreign
firm entry rate, moreover, is a more direct entry measure than macro data on cross border
financial flows, which are often used to measure FDI. In contrast to micro-data measures
based on the share of industry employment in all foreign-owned production units20 our
19If a foreign firm enters industry j simultaneously with more than one new plant in year t then employment
in all these plants is counted, but any form of firm expansion after the year of entry is excluded.
20See, for example, Aghion et al. (2004), Griﬃth et al. (2002) and Haskel et al. (2002).
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measure focuses precisely on entry and separates it out from employment expansion or
contraction of existing foreign firms and from reallocation between domestic and foreign
owners via takeover activity.
4.3 Distance to frontier
We measure the distance of each UK industry to the industry-specific technological frontier
using two alternative metrics for technology. In the context of the productivity growth
models we use disaggregated measures where each 4-digit UK industry is compared to a
matched 4-digit US industry.21 For the patent count models we use disaggregated measures
on the 3-digit SIC code level. Our main measure for UK industry j in year t is the relative
labor productivity measure
Djt =
1
3
2X
z=0
ln
(Y US/LUS)jt−z
(Y UK/LUK)jt−z
,
where Y denotes real output and L employment. Since we observe output and input data for
the pre-sample period we can use a lagged three year moving average to mitigate the eﬀects
of measurement error on the time variation of the distance variable. The second measure
we use is a superlative index relating TFP in each US industry to TFP in the corresponding
UK industry. Our empirical results in section 5 are shown to be robust to introducing this
second measure and to instrumenting both distance to frontier variables. Results are also
similar if we use and instrument discretised versions of the continuous distance variables
where we simply group industries close to and far from the technological frontier.
US industries are chosen as a reference point for the following reasons - the US represents
the technological frontier in a large number of industries, it is often ahead of the UK,22 and
a large share of foreign entrants in Britain are US-owned.23 To calculate the distance to
frontier measure we matched data on US 4-digit industries from the NBER manufacturing
21See App. B for details on the matching of UK and US industries.
22See, inter alia, Griﬃth et al. (2004).
23For the time period 1986 to 1992 our data shows that, on average, 34 percent of all foreign greenfield
entrants in British manufacturing industries are under US ownership.
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productivity database and the ARD data on domestic incumbent establishments in Britain
aggregated to the 4-digit industry level.24
British 4-digit industries diﬀer considerably in their distance to the industry-specific
frontier as illustrated in Table B.2, App. B. The table lists the 10 largest industries above
and below the median distance to frontier. The sample distribution of the distance measure
is such that about 20 percent of all industry-year observations are at or close to the frontier,
while another 20 percent of industries are more than 40 percent behind their US counterpart.
In the context of our study, high variation of the distance measure is crucial given our interest
in heterogeneity of entry eﬀects along the distance to frontier distribution.
Another important prerequisite for our empirical analysis is variation of entry rates across
industries with diﬀerent distance to the industry-specific frontier. We checked that all four
quartiles of the distance distribution cover industry-year observations where no, some or
substantial foreign entry occurs. In addition, comparing the quartile-specific distributions of
the entry rate, the number of employees in entering firms and entrants’ size we see in Table
B.3, App. B considerable overlap of these distributions.
4.4 Descriptive statistics
Our sample for the estimation of productivity growth models is an unbalanced panel of
23,802 observations on 4,947 domestic incumbent establishments in 180 4-digit industries,
1987 to 1993.25 81 percent of these establishments are older than 10 years when they enter
the sample. They have on average 274 employees, real output of £15m in 1980 £, and
experience TFP growth of on average -0.8 percentage points. This negative average growth
reflects the recession in the early 1990s; the corresponding figure up to 1990 is 1.3 percentage
24App. B provides details on the matching of UK and US industries. The ARD and NBER databases
contain data collected by national statistical agencies in each country using similar methods, and the data
on value-added and numbers employed use very similar definitions (see App. B for references). To the extent
that the definitions may vary across countries, this should be controlled for by industry and time fixed eﬀects.
We use labor productivity as our main measure as this is not aﬀected by diﬀerences in the way capital is
measured across the two datasets. However, we show that our results hold when using a TFP-based measure
(see section 5).
25See Appendix B on sample construction.
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points.
To estimate the patent count models we use an unbalanced panel of 1,085 observations
on 176 incumbent firms in 60 3-digit industries, 1987 to 1993. 74 percent of the firms were
listed on the LSE for more than a decade when entering the sample. They employ on average
about 8,549 people, have average real sales of £443m in 1980 £ and about 60 percent take
out at least one patent at the US Patent Oﬃce between 1987 and 1993. As typically found,
the distribution of patent counts is highly skewed - many firms in our sample do not patent,
some patent a little and a small number of firms are granted many patents per year.
Further details on data sources, sample construction and descriptive statistics are given
in Appendix B.
5 Empirical results
To investigate the economic mechanism behind the descriptive evidence in Figure 1 we esti-
mate productivity growth, as well as patent count models, where we control for confounding
factors and take endogeneity of entry and distance to frontier measures into account. Then,
we analyze how measurement issues and the key theoretical assumption on entry aﬀect our
results. We conclude by explaining why the most likely alternative interpretations based on
knowledge spillovers do not fully explain our empirical findings.
5.1 Growth of total factor productivity
To start with, we analyze the average eﬀect of entry on subsequent total factor productivity
(TFP) growth among incumbents in more restrictive models than equation (7). All regres-
sions in Table 1 include a full set of year and establishment-specific fixed eﬀects. Standard
errors are clustered on the industry level and observations are weighted by employment and
the inverse of their sampling probability.26
26See Moulton (1990) on standard error clustering. Observation weights and the sampling scheme are
described in Appendix B.
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[Table 1 here]
In column (1) we use a linear term of the lagged foreign firm entry rate (as defined in
section 4.2) and find a positive and significant eﬀect on subsequent TFP growth of domestic
incumbent establishments. We checked that the coeﬃcient of the entry rate is driven by
changes in the number of new employees in entering foreign firms, rather than changes in
the number of all employees in the industry.27
In column (2) we include three additional covariates - distance to the frontier, import
penetration and competition - and show that the average entry eﬀect is robust to controlling
for these factors. High values of the lagged distance measure indicate industries that are far
from the industry-specific frontier (see section 4.3 for the distance definition). The positive
and significant coeﬃcient indicates higher growth rates for domestic incumbents in industries
that are far from the frontier than in those close to it. We will return to this result in section
5.3.3.
Foreign firms can enter local product markets through imports, as well as by building
up local production capacity. We pay less attention to this alternative form of entry, mainly
because we have much less disaggregated import data. We control for lagged import pen-
etration and find a positive and significant eﬀect on subsequent TFP growth in domestic
incumbent establishments, however, it has little impact on the coeﬃcient of foreign firm
entry. To capture the influence of other rent-aﬀecting processes we use the lagged rent-based
competition measure described in Appendix B. It is calculated at the 4-digit industry level,
varies between 0 and 1 and takes the value of 1 in case of perfect competition. In line with
previous work, inter alia Nickell (1996), we find a positive and significant coeﬃcient.
In columns (3) and (5) we address the core endogeneity issues. As stated above, we
expect a negative covariance between actual foreign firm entry and the error term in our
TFP growth model, since foreign firms can more easily realize entry into markets when their
27In a regression with both elements of the entry rate included separately the coeﬃcient (standard error)
of the numerator, the number of entering employees, is positive and significant (0.017 (0.005)) while the
coeﬃcient of the denominator is small and insignificant (0.0003 (0.0002)).
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relative advantages are high and they anticipate this correctly. This is where productivity
growth and innovative activity of incumbents is weak and, thus, their chances to escape and
prevent entry are small. Note here, that the opposite expectation is often expressed, but not
confirmed in the literature of foreign direct investment: Foreign entrants may be attracted by
high growth perspectives of domestic incumbents and anticipate these correctly such that a
positive covariance between the entry variable and the error term in incumbent performance
equations would result. Attenuation bias (towards zero) in an OLS regression could also
be caused by measurement error. In the IV regression in column (3) we use as instruments
variables on product market policy changes that influence entry costs and, thus, eﬀected
entry threat and actual entry diﬀerentially across industries and time (see also section 3).
Statistics from the first stage regression of entry on the excluded policy instruments and
all other exogenous variables are shown at the bottom of Table 1.28 The instruments are
powerful, the F-test indicates their joint significance.29 No rejection of the overidentifying
restrictions is implied by the χ2-test result, and this also provides statistical support for the
overall set of policy instruments. We can show that the significant, positive entry eﬀect is
stable with respect to many changes of the model specification and the set of instruments.30
The F-test for the exogeneity of the entry term rejects the exogeneity of actual foreign
firm entry and highlights the importance of instrumenting. Since the IV coeﬃcient on the
28In all first stage regressions we impose the same coeﬃcient for all individual monopoly cases where
the coeﬃcients were not statistically diﬀerent from each other in intermediate versions of the first stage
regressions. Analogous restrictions are used in case of merger, privatization and SMP indicators. In addition,
we aggregate highly correlated policy dummies that relate to the same industry. The first stage entry
regression in column (3), thus, includes 11 separate instrumental variables.
29When calculating standard errors and test statistics we take into account that our dependent variables
in first stage regressions are measured at the industry level.
30For example, if we exclude all privatization instruments, we find the following entry coeﬃcient (standard
error): 2.896 (0.292). When, in turn, excluding the instruments that belong to one of the other groups
of policy changes (monopoly cases, merger cases, SMP introduction) the entry coeﬃcients are all positive,
significant and quite stable. They vary between 2.920 (0.362) and 3.841 (2.102). In all four model variants
with reduced instrument sets, these sets are jointly significant on the first stage and overidentification tests
never reject.
When we change the model specification to include industry-specific instead of establishment-specific fixed
eﬀects the entry coeﬃcient (standard error) is: 3.089 (0.314 ). When controlling for lagged establishment-
specific sales market shares instead of using the rent-based competition measure the entry eﬀect estimate is:
2.642 (0.275).
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foreign firm entry rate is larger than the OLS estimate, a negative bias is found, and this
is in line with our expectation of a negative covariance between entry and the error term in
our TFP growth model. It may also reflect an attenuation bias (towards zero) in the OLS
regression caused by measurement error.
The positive average impact of the direct foreign entry measure we use here on incumbent
TFP growth is in line with the results we find in Aghion et al (2004). There we use British
data for a longer time period and a less direct, noisier entry measure, i.e. the change of
the industry employment share in all foreign firms, not only in entrants.31 Our finding
is also consistent with the average incumbent productivity growth prediction that can be
derived from our theoretical model for plausible parameter assumptions (see Appendix A.3).
However, it is important to note that this is neither an unconditional implication of the
theory set out in section 2, nor is it in line with the empirical evidence from several studies
of foreign direct investment or liberalization reforms.32
Thus, we allow for more flexibility in the relation between foreign firm entry and pro-
ductivity growth to see whether there is systematic heterogeneity of entry eﬀects along the
industry- and time-varying distance to the industry-specific technological frontier. To do
this we estimate equation (7) including the continuous interaction of the entry and distance
to the frontier measures.
When including the interaction term, the coeﬃcients of the linear entry and distance
terms in column (4) remain positive and significant, as before. The interaction is negative
and significant. In industries that are far away from the frontier the positive eﬀect of entry is
now counteracted by the negative interaction eﬀect. Thus, productivity growth of domestic
incumbents responds more positively to technologically advanced entry in industries close to
the technological frontier than in industries farther below the frontier and this provides first
support for the second empirical implication from the theory in section 2.
31See also Griﬃth et al. (2002) and Haskel et al. (2002).
32For example, Javorcik (2004) and Aitken and Harrison (1999).
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Similar results arise when we control for endogeneity of entry and the distance to frontier
in column (5). We now have three first stage regressions, one for the linear entry term, one
for the linear distance term and one for the interaction term. Taking potential endogeneity
of the distance measure into account is important since any assumption we impose on that
variable directly feeds into our main finding of heterogeneous entry eﬀects. In addition to
policy instruments we use as further instruments measures of the production and technology
structure in US industries that are significantly correlated with the distance measure, but
which can be assumed not to depend directly on anticipated UK TFP growth developments.
We identify two such variables: the capital-labor ratio and average real wages among skilled
workers in US 4-digit industries at the beginning of the time period relevant for distance
measurement.33
The F-tests in the bottom panel of Table 1 shows that the set of instrumental variables
has explanatory power in all three first stage regressions. The χ2-test indicates no rejection
of the overidentifying restrictions. The F-test of joint exogeneity of all instrumented terms
in the second stage regression is rejected and, thus, taking endogeneity into account matters.
We find a negative and significant interaction term in column (5) and positive and significant
coeﬃcients on the linear terms for entry and distance to frontier. Again we can show that
the results are stable with respect to changing the model specification as above and varying
the set of instruments.34
The estimation results above strongly indicate heterogeneity in the impact of foreign
firm entry on subsequent TFP growth in domestic incumbent establishments, depending
33To capture the eﬀect of US technology on the distance of UK industries to the frontier we also tried
research and development intensities in 2-digit US industries and the US ratio of skilled over all workers
in 4-digit industries. However, both these variables turned out to have no explanatory power in first stage
distance regressions. This finding deviates from what we find in the firm sample used for patent count models
below.
34Most important, we find stable results if we vary the main instrument set by excluding in turn privatiza-
tion, monopoly, merger or SMP instruments. The second stage estimates for the linear entry coeﬃcient then
vary between 3.864 (2.544) and 4.823 (1.621) and those for the distance term between 0.077 (0.051) and
0.088 (0.043). The interaction estimates take values between -8.387 (3.111) and -10.957 (7.751). In each
model, both entry-related coeﬃcients (linear and interacted) are jointly significant at the 1%-significance
level. Moreover, the reduced instrument sets are always significant on the first stage and overidentification
tests never reject.
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on the industry’s distance to the frontier, and a positive average impact. But what about
the economic significance of these eﬀect estimates? To see that we calculate the impact of
increasing the entry rate by one standard deviation in the sample (0.5 percent) on subsequent
incumbent TFP growth at the 10%, 50% and 90% percentile of the sample distance to
frontier distribution. In industries at the median distance to frontier an increase of the
foreign firm entry rate by one standard deviation raises TFP growth in domestic incumbent
establishments by 1.4 percentage points.35 In industries far from the frontier, i.e. at the
90%-percentile of the distance distribution, the TFP growth eﬀect is -0.3 percentage points
and close to the frontier (10%-percentile) the eﬀect is 3.1 percentage points. Since the mean
of TFP growth in the sample is -0.8 percentage points, and the standard deviation is 11.3
percentage points, these estimates are economically significant and their variation along the
distance to frontier distribution is reasonable. All in all, the results in columns (4) and (5)
of Table 1 consistently show that the threat of technologically advanced entry in industries
close to the frontier triggers subsequent TFP growth among incumbents and can discourage
it in industries far from the frontier.
5.2 Patenting
The TFP growth evidence shown above provides support for the idea that entry spurs in-
cumbents to invest in innovation, particularly when they are near the technological frontier.
Lingering concerns are, however, that TFP growth may not only reflect entry-induced inno-
vative activity, but also entrant imitation or that TFP growth may be driven by reallocation
between plants within incumbent establishments. In order to explore the relation between
entry and innovation more directly we estimate patent count models that are specified in
a similar manner as the TFP growth models. While using an entirely diﬀerent dataset to
measure firm-level innovation (see section 4) we find a strikingly similar pattern of results.
35This median eﬀect based on column (5) is equal to the average eﬀect since the sample distance distribution
is unskewed. Moreover, the result of 1.4 is similar to the impact of 1.5 that is implied by the model in column
(3) with a linear entry term only.
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In Table 2 we present estimates from negative binomial models that allow for overdisper-
sion of the patent count variable and include time as well as 3-digit industry fixed eﬀects.
We capture unobservable firm-specific, time-invariant heterogeneity of patenting behavior
by exploiting rich pre-sample patent data. Following Blundell et al. (1999) we add as ex-
planatory variables two proxies for a firm’s technological knowledge stock: the firm-specific
pre-sample patent stock and an indicator for non-zero pre-sample patent stock values. As
expected, the coeﬃcients on both these variables are found to be significant and positive.
In line with what we find in the TFP growth regressions, the foreign firm entry rate
has a positive and significant average eﬀect on subsequent patenting at the US patent oﬃce
by incumbents listed on the London Stock Exchange, and this holds up to controlling for
other factors, changing the model specification and, most importantly, controlling for the
endogeneity of entry. As in column (3) of Table 1, the set of policy instruments is jointly
significant in the first stage entry regression in column (3), Table 2. The residual from
this first stage regression, when used as control function in the second stage regression, has
a significant, negative coeﬃcient indicating a negative bias in the non-instrumented entry
coeﬃcient and this is robust to several tested changes of the model specification or the
instrument set.36
The estimated eﬀects of other factors are similar to our results for TFP growth models,
and consistent with other findings in the literature. We again find a positive and significant
coeﬃcient for the distance to the industry-specific frontier. The inverted U-relationship we
observe for competition and patent counts is in line with Aghion et al. (2005a). When
controlling for import penetration, we find positive, but weak eﬀects, as in Blundell et al.
(1999) or Disney et al. (2003b).
36When we change the set of instruments, as explained in subsection 5.1, we find significant, positive entry
eﬀects in all four model variants with reduced instrument sets. The respective instrument sets are jointly
significant in the first stage and the second stage entry coeﬃcients (standard errors) vary between 26.542
(15.877) and 45.956 (13.473).
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In column (4) we explore the heterogeneity of foreign firm entry eﬀects on subsequent
incumbent innovation activity along the industry- and time-varying distance to the industry-
specific frontier. As in TFP growth models, we find a negative and significant interaction
term and positive and significant coeﬃcients of the linear entry and distance to frontier
terms. Thus, the positive eﬀect of the linear entry term gets increasingly counteracted by
the negative interaction eﬀect the farther away the industry is from the technological frontier.
This pattern provides support for the first empirical implication in section 2.
When we control for endogeneity of actual foreign firm entry and distance to frontier in
column (5) of Table 2 we estimate first stage regressions for the linear entry term, the linear
distance to frontier term and their interaction. The χ2-test results in the lower part of Table
2 show that the set of policy and US instruments we use has explanatory power in all three
first stage regressions.37 Joint exogeneity of all instrumented terms is rejected in the second
stage regression. The pattern of our estimates remains robust to several tested changes of
the model specification and the set of instruments.38
The economic magnitude of the estimated eﬀects also varies in a similar way along the
sample distance to frontier distribution, as in the corresponding TFP growth model. In
industries at median distance an increase of the foreign firm entry rate by one standard
deviation (0.4 percent) raises the number of patents that incumbents take out subsequently
by 6 percent, i.e. from the mean patent number of 8.1 to 8.6. In industries far from the
frontier (90%-percentile) the subsequent patent number is reduced to 7.3 patents and close
to the frontier (10%-percentile) it increases to 11.0 patents. The latter increase is equivalent
to about 12 percent of the patent count standard deviation in the sample (24.1 patents) and,
37We use as measures of the production and technology structure in US industries: the ratios of capital over
labor and of skilled over all workers in 4-digit US industries as well as research and development intensities
in 2-digit US industries. In addition we use all seven interaction terms between the US-related and policy
instruments that turned out to be significant in the distance-related first stage regression.
38Most important, we vary the set of instruments as for the TFP growth model in column (5), Table
1. The respective reduced instrument sets have explanatory power on the first stage and the two second
stage entry-related coeﬃcients are always jointly significant at the 2%-significance level. The linear entry
coeﬃcient takes values between 37.159 (12.558) and 73.645 (40.757), the linear distance term between 1.744
(0.356) and 3.296 (0.746) and the interaction coeﬃcient between -109.856 (51.515) and -233.974 (168.939).
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thus, the findings are reasonable.
Altogether, the patent count results suggest that a major driving force of the entry eﬀects
in our TFP growth estimations is incumbent innovation, not just imitation or reallocation.
5.3 Robustness
So far, we have presented empirical results that support the finding in Figure 1 and the
theoretical interpretation put forward in Section 2. We used data on productivity growth
and patenting of incumbents coming from diﬀerent sources and showed robustness of the
results to several changes of the model specification and instrumentation strategy. In this
section we explore the robustness of our results in three other directions. First, we consider
potential influences of measurement error. Secondly, we relax the key theoretical assumption
that foreign firms always enter at the technological frontier and investigate eﬀects of the
domestic firm entry rate in that context. Third, we argue why the two most likely alternative
interpretations based on knowledge spillovers do not fully explain our empirical findings.
5.3.1 Measurement issues
There are three forms of measurement error that concern us here - (i) measurement of
dependent variables, (ii) measurement of the distance to the frontier, (iii) the consequences
of using an unbalanced panel. We consider these in turn.
The standard factor share approach we use here to calculate TFP growth instead of
estimating it has the advantage of involving the use of a superlative index building on a
flexible translog production function. A usual concern, however, is that it relies on the
assumption of perfect competition in factor and product markets. In case of imperfectly
competitive product markets the level of TFP will systematically be overstated,39 and if
the impact of reducing entry barriers is accompanied by increasing competition, this would
imply underestimating TFP growth. Thus, it is important to consider whether our results
are robust to relaxing this assumption. We calculate an alternative measure of TFP growth
39See, inter alia, Klette and Griliches (1996).
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that takes imperfect competition into account (see Appendix B). When using the alternative
measure we again obtain positive and significant coeﬃcients for entry and the distance to
frontier and a negative and significant coeﬃcient for the interaction term. Using labor
productivity growth also gives similar results.40
Our second concern is with measurement of the distance to the frontier. In section
4.3 we introduce an index that relates labor productivity in 4-digit UK industries to labor
productivity in corresponding 4-digit US industries as our preferred measure because it is not
aﬀected by capital stock measurement in the two relevant data bases. However, the results
remain robust when using a relative TFP index that is also measured on the 4-digit industry
level in columns (1) and (4) of Table 3. In addition to varying the index, we deviate from
our preferred specification here: we interact entry with two dummies respectively indicating
industries near or further behind the frontier, use as well the linear continuous distance to
frontier term, and instrument all three terms. We find that both TFP growth as well as
patent count regressions support the conjecture that entry threat spurs incumbents to invest
in innovation most in industries near the technological frontier.
[Table 3 here]
Finally, we want to clarify that our results do not depend on poor performing incumbents
that are driven out of the market by entrants and the subsequent reallocation of resources.
We eliminate establishments and firms that drop out of our panels and show the respective
TFP growth estimation in column (3) and the patent count estimation in column (6) of
Table 3. The results are found to hold as well for these subsamples.
40Using the alternative TFP growth measure leads to a coeﬃcient (standard error) of -6.771 (2.872) for
the interaction, 4.175 (0.422) for the linear entry and 0.088 (0.043) for the distance terms. Using labor
productivity gives as estimates for the interaction, linear entry and distance terms: -8.308 (3.923), 2.381
(0.898), 0.289 (0.124). In both models the set of instruments is jointly significant on the first stage and
overidentification tests do not reject.
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5.3.2 Entry behind the technological frontier
In the empirical analysis above we focused entirely on foreign firm entry. Since foreign entry is
from firms that operate internationally, and are more likely to produce at the technological
frontier than other entrants in the UK, this accords well with considering technologically
advanced entry in our theory section 2, where we assumed that entry takes place at the new
frontier A¯t.
Alternatively, we can explore the case where entrants have productivity At−1 instead of
At using our theoretical framework. This case leads to the main conclusion that increasing
the threat of entry encourages innovation and productivity growth in sectors that are at
intermediate distance from the frontier; it discourages innovation in sectors that are far
below the frontier; and it has little eﬀect on innovation in sectors close to the frontier. In
the case where entrants have productivity At−2 or are even further behind the frontier, no
eﬀects on innovation and productivity growth are to be expected.41
This prediction can explain the empirical results we find when exploring the eﬀects of
the domestic firm entry rate on subsequent incumbent TFP growth or patenting. Coeﬃcient
estimates for domestic entry terms always turn out to be insignificant in our models. See,
for example, columns (2) and (5) in Table 3 and note that the coeﬃcients of the foreign
firm entry terms remain very similar to those in columns (5) of Tables 1 and 2. The in-
significant coeﬃcients for domestic entry terms are in line with the following findings from
the literature on firm entry and new firm performance:42 The average domestic entrant is
likely to struggle with survival during its initial period after market entry, is occupied with
learning about its own productivity and market conditions and is usually very small com-
pared to foreign entrants or incumbents in the same industry.43 Among the small number of
41No entry would then be observed in the theoretical model since entry is optimal only when the entrant
can take away market shares from the incumbent.
42See, for example, Caves (1998), Dunne et al. (1988), Disney et al. (2003a) and Geroski (1995).
43According to our ARD data, for example, the average plant size of domestic entrants is about 10 times
smaller than that of foreign entrants in their industry and about 7 times smaller than that of incumbent
plants that are at least 5 years old.
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innovative domestic entrants are many that are initially hampered by financial constraints
and immaturity of their technologies such that they are unlikely to challenge incumbents
during their first years after market entry. Thus, aggregate domestic firm entry rates that
do not exploit detailed firm information to separate between diﬀerent types of domestic en-
trants pick up entry behind the technological frontier and insignificant eﬀects on subsequent
incumbent performance are reasonable.
5.3.3 Resource reallocation and knowledge spillovers
Our analysis so far contributes to a better understanding of the heterogeneity of entry ef-
fects on incumbent innovation and productivity growth across diﬀerent industries. There are,
however, other mechanisms whereby entry induces economic growth, that are not explored in
this paper. The most important one is reallocation of productive inputs and outputs. High
productivity entrants may induce the replacement of low productivity firms and thus increase
productivity measured on an aggregated level. Empirical support for the importance of this
mechanism is provided by Olley and Pakes (1996), Pavcnik (2002) and others. The dynamic
industry model with heterogeneous firms by Melitz (2003) provides a theoretical analysis of
reallocative eﬀects triggered by opening up industries to international trade. In contrast to
what we do, within-firm productivity is assumed to be constant in that paper and innovation
incentives of incumbent firms are not considered. Bernard et al. (2003) consider reallocation
of resources, plant turnover and measured productivity changes of incumbents caused by
changing prices or by mark-up changes in an imperfect competition framework. They do not
analyze eﬀects of policy changes on within-firm incentives of incumbents, especially not het-
erogenous within-firm reactions. While we do not consider the within-industry reallocation
eﬀects these papers focus on we investigate in detail how entry eﬀects within-firm changes
of innovation incentives and productivity growth, and does so diﬀerently in industries at
diﬀerent distance to the industry-specific technological frontier.
Finally, we want to discuss the extent to which alternative theoretical explanations are
also consistent with the pattern of empirical results reported above. Potential candidates
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are theories that focus on the role of knowledge spillovers instead of innovation incentives.
Consider the widely established idea that firms and sectors further from the frontier should
benefit most from knowledge spillovers, since the scope for learning is highest there.44 This
suggests positive coeﬃcients on the linear distance to frontier terms, as well as on the inter-
actions with entry. We find, however, a diﬀerent pattern, namely negative interaction eﬀects
and positive level eﬀects of the distance to frontier measure (see sections 5.1 and 5.2 and
tables 1 to 3).
Our theoretical model generates predictions that are in line with both our empirical
results. In section 2 we established the prediction of a negative interaction eﬀect - innovation
and productivity growth of incumbents in sectors close to the technological frontier react
more positively to entry threat than in sectors further below the frontier. Now we show that
if there is no threat of entry then the expected incumbent performance in a sector would be
greater the further the sector is from the frontier (i.e. the level eﬀect of the distance to the
frontier would be positive). Assume for a moment that p1 = p2 = 0. Then the innovation
rates in the diﬀerent types of sectors become:
z1 = (δ/c) (γ − 1) < z2 = (δ/c) γ < 1
from which we obtain:45
g1 = z1 (γ − 1) < g2 = z2 (γ − 1) < g3 = (γ − 1) .
Such a positive eﬀect of the initial distance to frontier on expected productivity growth is
to be expected in any model where sectors converge to the same expected growth rate.46
44Griﬃth et al. (2004) find empirical support for such consequences of general spillovers looking across
a panel of OECD industries and countries. Griﬃth et al. (2002) find similar evidence at the establishment
level in the UK.
45See footnote 13 for the derivation of g3.
46In this particular model the economic reason for the result is twofold. First, expected growth in a sector
three steps behind the frontier is higher than in a sector two steps behind because the former sector upgrades
with probability one. Second, when there is no entry threat then a sector that is two steps behind is expected
to grow faster than a sector just one step behind, because if the leader of the state-2 sector does not innovate
then its rival, who is three steps behind the frontier, will catch up with him and the leader will earn no
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Another idea prevalent in the existing literature on knowledge spillovers argues that firms
in industries closer to the technological frontier have higher absorptive capacity and may
benefit more from spillovers. If so, then firms in industries closer to the frontier should react
stronger to general spillovers, as well as to knowledge transfers from entrants, than firms in
industries farther behind the frontier. Our finding of negative and significant coeﬃcients on
the interaction terms is consistent with this. But the positive and significant coeﬃcients for
the linear distance to frontier terms are not in line with this explanation.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the substantial heterogeneity we see in the eﬀects of entry on
incumbent performance. We show first that the finding can be explained in the context of
a simple multi-sector Schumpeterian growth model with entry. The main implication of the
theoretical model is that a higher threat from technologically advanced entrants should en-
courage incumbent innovation in sectors that are initially close to the technological frontier
(this we refer to as the “escape-entry eﬀect”), whereas it may discourage incumbent innova-
tion in sectors that are initially further behind the frontier (this we call the “discouragement
eﬀect” of entry). The intuition for these two eﬀects is quite simple. In the former case,
incumbent firms that are initially close to the frontier know they can escape entry by inno-
vating; therefore a higher threat of entry will result in more intensive innovation activities
aimed at escaping that threat. In the latter case, incumbents that are further behind the
frontier have no hope to win against an entrant.
In the second part of the paper, we estimate the eﬀects of entry allowing for eﬀect hetero-
geneity. We use panel data from two entirely diﬀerent sources - one containing information
on incumbent TFP growth at the establishment level, the other containing information on
patenting behavior of stock market listed firms. In both cases we control for confounding
profits, whereas if the leader in a state-1 sector fails to innovate it will still remain one step ahead of its rival
and hence will still earn positive profits; accordingly, the escape competition eﬀect will give the leader in a
state-2 sector a greater incentive to innovate than the leader of a state-1 sector.
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factors and for endogeneity of our main measure for technologically advanced entry, the
foreign firm entry rate. We exploit exogenous variation across industries and time coming
from product market interventions in the UK, including the introduction of the EU Single
Market Program, decisions by the competition authorities and (de)regulations in the form of
privatization decisions. Given our focus on heterogeneity of entry eﬀects along the distance
to frontier we also consider the endogeneity of distance measures and use US production and
technology information as additional instruments. Our empirical analysis provides robust
evidence and vindicates the theoretical implications of our growth model with entry. Most
important, technologically advanced entry by foreign firms has a positive eﬀect on innova-
tion in sectors initially close to the frontier, but not on innovation in sectors initially further
behind the frontier, and the eﬀect of entry on productivity growth interacts negatively with
the distance to frontier.
The results of our theoretical and empirical analysis can be linked to the policy debates on
market (de)regulation, competition policy, large scale privatization, and trade liberalization.
The main implication is that policies aiming at decreasing or removing entry barriers alone
may not be suﬃcient to foster growth of incumbent firms in all sectors of an economy, even
if such policies are found to be growth-enhancing on average. This, in turn, may suggest the
introduction of complementary policies that facilitate, as well as the abolition of regulations
that slow down, the reallocation of factors and resources towards sectors responding more
positively to higher entry threat.
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A Theory appendix
A.1 Endogenizing entry:
Suppose that in an industry where the current leader is a type-j firm, entrants at time t
need to pay the following entry fee to get an entry opportunity:
Fjt = λAt + η(At −At−j),
where j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and λ is random and uniformly distributed between 0 and Λ. The term
in η reflects the additional cost that may arise for an entrant that brings up to frontier level
a sector that was initially further below that frontier. In particular a high, positive η will
tend to make the equilibrium probability of entry into an industry a decreasing function of
the industry’s initial distance to frontier, whereas the opposite will hold if η is small or equal
to zero. Our main predictions turn out to be independent of whether η is high or low.
The probability of entry in a type-j sector is equal to the probability that the potential
entrant pays the cost of entry, which in turn is the probability that the entrant’s expected
profit is greater than the entry fee Fjt.
In a type-2 or type-3 sector, where the expected profit of an entrant is δAt:
pj = pr(δAt > Fjt) =
δ − η(1− 1/γj)
Λ
, j ∈ {2, 3}. (10)
In a type-1 sector, the expected profit of an entrant is δAt(1 − z1), where z1 denotes the
probability that a type-1 incumbent leader innovates. In the main text we showed that this
innovation probability itself depends upon the entry threat p1, with
z1 = δ(p1 + γ − 1)/c.
Thus, the probability p1 must satisfy the fixed point equation:
p1 = pr(δAt(1− z1) > F1t) =
δ − δ2(γ − 1)/c− η(1− 1/γ)− δ2p1/c
Λ
, (11)
or equivalently
p1 =
δ − δ2(γ − 1)/c− η(1− 1/γ)
Λ+ δ2/c
. (12)
Therefore, all probabilities pj are decreasing in the common entry cost parameter Λ,
namely p0J(Λ) < 0 with j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
A.2 From entry threat to actual entry:
The actual rate of entry in state-2 sectors is
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E2 = p2(Λ), (13)
since potential entrants can never lose against a type-2 incumbent. Thus, entry threat
and actual entry are the same, and therefore the comparative statics of innovation as a
function of entry threat also leads to the unambiguous prediction of a negative correlation
between innovation by type-2 incumbents and actual entry in state-2 sectors.
The actual entry rate in state-1 sectors is
E1 = p1(1− z1), (14)
so that the relationship between entry threat and actual entry in state-1 sectors is a priori
ambiguous: a higher entry threat induces more innovative activity by type-1 incumbents in
order to prevent entry, thereby counteracting the positive direct eﬀect of entry threat on
actual entry. However, the overall eﬀect of entry threat on actual entry is positive, i.e. the
eﬀect of the entry cost parameter Λ on actual entry is negative, when Λ is not too small
relative to the profit rate δ and the inverse of the R&D cost parameter c. We have
∂E1
∂Λ
= (1− 1
c
δ(γ − 1)− 21
c
δp1(Λ))p
0
1(Λ),
that is negative if and only if
p1(Λ) <
1− δ(γ − 1)/c
2δ/c
.
This holds if
Λ > δ2/c.
A.3 Steady-state distribution of sectors and average incumbent
productivity growth
Here we derive the steady-state fractions of all sectors j and show that increased threat of
entry has a positive eﬀect on the average rate of productivity growth among active incumbent
firms across all sectors of the economy for plausible values of the R&D cost parameter c,
frontier growth rate γ, entry cost parameter Λ and the additional cost term η. The latter
cost term arises for an entrant that brings up to frontier level a sector that was initially
further below the frontier. Let qj denote the steady-state fraction of sectors in state j and
A¯t−j the productivity in such sectors at the beginning of period t. In steady state, the net
flow of sectors into each technological state j ∈ {1, 2, 3} must equal the net flow out of that
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state. More formally, if pj denotes the entry threat into a type-j sector, we have:
p2q2 + p3q3 = (1− p1) (1− z1) q1; (15)
(1− p1) (1− z1) q1 = [p2 + (1− p2)(1− z2)]q2; (16)
(1− p2)(1− z2)q2 = p3q3; (17)
plus the normalization
q1 + q2 + q3 = 1. (18)
The left hand sides (right hand sides) of (15), (16) and (17) correspond to the net flows into
(out of) states 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Only three of the above four equations are linearly
independent, and thus can be used to solve for q1, q2, q3. Then, if g denotes the average
productivity growth rate among active incumbent firms, we have:
g = q1g1 + q2g2 + q3g3.
We want to know how this growth rate is impacted by an increase in the entry cost parameter
Λ in the short run; that is, holding constant the probabilities qi defining the distribution of
initial technology gaps.
We can establish the following:
Proposition: For η, γ and Λ suﬃciently small, if δ < c then:
dg
dΛ
¯¯¯¯
q=const
≡ q1
dg1
dΛ
+ q2
dg2
dΛ
+ q3
dg3
dΛ
< 0.
Proof: Since g3 is independent of Λ, we have:
dg
dΛ
¯¯¯¯
q=const
= q1
dg1
dΛ
+ q2
dg2
dΛ
= (γ − 1)(q1
dz1
dΛ
+ q2
dz2
dΛ
),
where we have made use of equation (5) in the text. Let
u = δ/c and φ = Λ/δ.
Now if we can prove the proposition for η = 0, by continuity it will also hold for η small.
Thus, let us fix η at zero. Using (10) and (12) we can then reexpress the probabilities of
entry as:
p1 (φ) =
1− u(γ − 1)
φ+ u
and p2 (φ) = p3 (φ) = 1/φ. (19)
We can use (19) to reexpress the equilibrium innovation rates z1 and z2 respectively as:
⎧
⎨
⎩
z1 (φ) = u(p1 (φ) + γ − 1)
z2 (φ) = u(1− p2(φ))γ
⎫
⎬
⎭ (20)
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Next, using the steady-state equations (15) ∼ (18), we get:
⎧
⎨
⎩
q1 (φ) =
p2(φ)
p2(φ)+(1−p1(φ))(1−z1(φ))
q2 (φ) =
q1(φ)(1−p1(φ))(1−z1(φ))
p2(φ)+(1−p2(φ))(1−z2(φ))
⎫
⎬
⎭ (21)
So, we have:
dg
dΛ
¯¯¯¯
q=const
= (γ − 1) (q1 (φ) δz01 (φ) + q2 (φ) δz02 (φ))
∼
µ
z01 (φ) +
q2 (φ)
q1 (φ)
z02 (φ)
¶
∼
µ
p01 (φ)−
(1− p1 (φ))(1− z1 (φ))
p2 (φ) + (1− p2 (φ))(1− z2 (φ))
γp02 (φ)
¶
=
µ
−1− u(γ − 1)
(φ+ u)2
+
(1− p1 (φ))(1− z1 (φ))
p2 (φ) + (1− p2 (φ))(1− z2 (φ))
γ
1
φ2
¶
Clearly φ and γ have a lower limit of unity. (If φ < 1 then p2 = p3 > 1, which makes no
sense.) As we approach the limiting case where φ = γ = 1 then, from (19) ∼ (21), we have:
p1 (φ)→
1
1 + u
, p2 (φ)→ 1, z1 (φ)→
u
1 + u
and z2 (φ)→ 0
Substituting these into the final expression above for dgdΛ
¯¯
q=const, we have in the limit:
dg
dΛ
¯¯¯¯
q=const
∼
µ
− 1− u
(1 + u)2
¶
in which the right-hand side is negative when δ < c because then u < 1. k
B Data appendix
B.1 Data sources
Plant and establishment level data for the manufacturing sector come from the UK
Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS). Its Annual Respondents Database (ARD) contains the
micro data underlying the UK Annual Census of Production.47 Annual data on industry
classification, ownership and employment is available for the whole population of British
plants and allows for the construction of entry measures.48 Extensive additional data on
inputs and outputs is available for a random stratified sample of establishments selected
47For recent years, the database is named Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). See Barnes and Martin (2002),
Griﬃth (1999) and Oulton (1997) for further information.
48Before calculating entry measures we cleaned and checked the plant population data for 1973-1995,
thereby reducing the number of observations by about 10 percent.
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for a detailed annual survey.49 The ARD survey is conducted under the 1947 Statistical
Trade Act and survey response is mandatory. Establishments with more than 100 employees
are all selected, as well as a stratified random sample of smaller units.50 The plant and
establishment data is supplemented with ownership information that is yearly updated from
Dun & Bradstreet’s "Who own’s Whom". Owner nationality indicates for all plants and
establishments of a firm the nationality of the largest shareholder controlling at least 20
percent of that firm. We weight observations by employment and the inverse of their sampling
probability.
We restricted our sample to observations on incumbent establishments under domestic
ownership that are (i) at least 5 years old or (ii) had at least once between 1986 and 1993 more
than 100 employees.51 We excluded from the sample all establishments not yet producing or
under public ownership, observations before 1987 and after 1993, trimmed the sample with
respect to key variables,52 dropped establishments observed for less than three consecutive
years and do not allow for reappearance of establishments. The resulting sample contains
23,802 observations on 4,947 domestic incumbent establishments. Descriptive statistics are
provided in Table B.4.
Firm level data on patenting activity is taken from the NBER/Case Western Patent
database that covers over two million patents granted by the US Patent Oﬃce since 1901.
The patent data is linked to annual DataStream accounting data since 1968 for a sample
of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 1985.53 All firms in the database
are considered to be incumbent since firms listed at the LSE are typically reasonably old
and large. For estimation purposes we purged the raw database from non-manufacturing
firms and observations before 1987 and after 1993, trimmed the sample with respect to key
variables,54 and excluded firms with less than three consecutive observations considering
accounting periods of less (more) than 300 (400) days as series breaks. This leaves us with
49About 76 percent of all sampled establishments between 1980 and 1993 are single plants, all others
represent groups of on average 1.6 plants operating in the same 4-digit industry and owned by the same firm.
50The sample selected for the survey accounts for about 90 percent of annual total British manufacturing
employment according to Oulton (1997).
51Empirical results were robust when experimenting with stricter definitions, for example, when imposing
(i) and (ii).
52We dropped observations with missing key variables (output, value added, intermediate inputs, em-
ployment, capital stock), observations where absolute growth in key variables was over 150 percent, and
observations with extreme values below (above) the 1- (99-)percent percentiles of the productivity growth,
entry rate or distance to frontier distributions.
53The sample covers 415 firms listed at LSE in 1985 with names starting with A-L and all top 100 R&D
spenders not already included. Subsidiaries of these firms were identified using "Who owns Whom" by Dun
and Bradstreet in 1985 and all entities were matched by name to the NBER/Case Western Patent database.
See Bloom and Van Reenen (2002) for further information.
54We dropped observations with missing values of sales, capital and employment, observations where
absolute growth of these key variables exceeded 150 percent, and observations with extreme values of the
entry rate or distance to frontier distributions.
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an estimation sample of 1,085 observations on 176 firms described in greater detail in Table
B.4.
Industry level data on US 4-digit industries come from the NBER manufacturing
productivity (MP) database and for UK industries it is aggregated from the ARD database.55
When calculating the distance to frontier measures for the productivity growth (patent count)
models we matched UK 4-digit (3-digit) industries to the corresponding US 4-digit (3-digit)
industries. For the matching we used the US SIC 1987 and the UK SIC 1980 industry code.56
Further 2-digit industry level data on import penetration in UK and US R&D intensity are
taken from the OECD STAN database.
B.2 Definitions of variables
Productivity growth: When calculating TFP growth we apply a standard factor share ap-
proach, use a superlative index derived from a flexible translog specification of the production
technology (Caves et al. 1982a, b), and disaggregated ARD survey data on establishment
output and inputs:
4TFPit = 4 lnYit −
ZX
z=1
α˜zit4 lnxzit, (22)
where Y denotes output, Z the number of factors of production, and xzit the quantity used
of factor z in establishment i at time t. We consider four factors of production in Z: skilled
labor (administratives, technical and clerical workers), unskilled labor (operatives), the stock
of physical capital, and intermediate inputs.
Factor shares α˜zit are defined as α˜
z
it = (α
z
it + α
z
it−1)/2 with α
z
it denoting the cost of factor
z relative to total output value in establishment i at time t. Since observed factor shares
αzit can be noisy and may exceed one we apply a smoothing procedure proposed by Harrigan
(1997). Assuming a translog production technology, constant returns to scale (CRS), and
standard market-clearing conditions, αzit can be expressed as follows:
αzit = ψi + ϕjt +
ZX
z=2
ωzj ln
µ
xzit
x1it
¶
, (23)
where ψi is a establishment-specific constant, ϕjt an industry-time-specific constant and
where we normalize relative to production factor 1 to impose CRS.57 If observed factor
shares deviate from the left-hand side of this equation by an i.i.d. measurement error term,
55See Bartelsman and Gray (1996) and Griﬃth (1999) for variable definitions in both databases.
56Of all 205 4-digit industries in the ARD database 146 could be linked exclusively to one or several US
4-digit industries. 50 of the remaining industries could be successfully linked to US industries after having
formed pairs and three larger groups of 4-digit industries. Nine UK industries could not be linked to an
industry in the US manufacturing sector.
57See Caves et al. (1982b) and Harrigan (1997).
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then its parameters can be estimated by running separate fixed eﬀects panel data regressions
for each 4-digit industry j. The fitted values from (23) are then used as factor shares in the
calculation of (22).
For our main TFP growth measure we impose constant returns to scale (
P
z α˜
z
it = 1).
Alternatively, we follow Klette (1999) and use estimated price markups above costs to cal-
culate a second TFP growth measure that does not depend on the assumption of perfect
product market competition.58
Number of patents: The dependent variable in the patent count models is the annual
number of patents a firm listed at the LSE took out at the U. S. Patent Oﬃce.
Import penetration: We calculate the ratio of the annual value of imports over domestic
output using 2-digit industry level data from the OECD STAN database.
Competition: For the productivity growth (patent count) models we use a 4-digit (3-
digit) industry level competition index that is defined as 1 minus a market share-weighted
average of the Lerner index across all establishments in the industry. The measure takes
values between 0 and 1 and a value of 1 indicates perfect competition. The establishment-
specific Lerner index is proxied by annual output minus labor, intermediate good and capital
costs divided by output using ARD data.59
Pre-sample patent variable: Pre-sample patent information for firms listed at LSE is
used to construct a measure of the firm-specific patent stock built up between 1968 and the
beginning of the first year the firm is in our estimation sample, i.e. 1987 in most cases. We
apply the perpetual inventory method and calculate the stock measure as the sum of all pre-
sample patents depreciated to the end of the pre-sample period using an annual knowledge
depreciation rate of 30 percent.60 In addition to the stock measure, we constructed an
indicator of pre-sample patenting activity equal to one if the firm ever patented in the pre-
sample period.
For the definition of entry and distance to frontier measures see section 4 in the main
text.
[Tables B.1-B.4 here]
58Empirical results when using this measure and results when using a standard labor productivity measure
are reported in sub-section 5.3.1.
59Experimenting with an unweighted average or diﬀerent weights had only negligible eﬀects on the esti-
mated eﬀects of entry, distance to frontier and interaction terms. Using a market share measure instead of
a rent-based competition measure also gave similar results.
60We found our empirical results to be insensitive to the chosen depreciation rate when experimenting
with other rates between 15 and 45 percent.
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Figure 1: Entry effects near and far from the technological frontier 
 
 
Notes: The figure plots spline estimates of the relation between the foreign firm entry rate and subsequent 
TFP growth of domestic incumbent establishments in UK 4-digit industries, 1987 to 1993. Each dot 
represents the average TFP growth estimate for establishments in one industry-year cell. Three spline 
points are chosen such that all establishment observations in industry-year cells with non-zero entry are 
grouped into four equally sized classes. The distance to technological frontier is a relative labor 
productivity measure relating 4-digit US to UK industries. The top (blue) curve is for establishments in 
industry-year cells near the technological frontier, i.e. less or equally distant to the frontier as the sample 
median of the distance. The bottom (red) curve is for establishments further behind the technological 
frontier, i.e. more distant to the frontier than the sample median. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using ONS and other data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright. 
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Table 1: TFP growth models 
Notes: The sample consists of 23,802 observations on domestic incumbent establishments between 1987 and 
1993. Robust standard errors in brackets and italics are clustered by industry. *** (**, *) indicates 
significance at the 1 (5, 10)-percent significance level. Observations are weighted by employment and the 
inverse of their sampling probability. For first stage test results degrees of freedom are in brackets. All 
regressions include a full set of year dummies and establishment fixed effects. The variable foreign entry is 
the lagged foreign firm entry rate, distance to frontier is the lagged relative labor productivity measure 
relating 4-digit US to UK industries, import penetration is lagged imports over domestic output, and 
competition is a lagged rent-based competition measure. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using ONS and other data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright. 
 Dependent variable: 
growth of total factor productivityijt 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
foreign entryjt-1*distancejt-1    -4. 422*** -9. 316*** 
    (1. 386) (2. 226) 
foreign entryjt-1 0. 796** 0. 737** 2. 971*** 1. 821*** 4. 657*** 
 (0. 382) (0. 375) (0. 327) (0. 468) (0. 385) 
distance to frontierjt-1  0. 079*** 0. 073** 0. 089*** 0. 082** 
  (0. 027) (0. 026) (0. 025) (0. 039) 
import penetrationjt-1  0. 079** 0. 077** 0. 080** 0. 080** 
  (0. 033) (0. 035) (0. 033) (0. 034) 
competitionjt-1  0. 127* 0. 140** 0. 117* 0. 121** 
  (0. 071) (0. 058) (0. 065) (0. 049) 
F, exogeneity of…     
entry 26. 90(1)***    
entry, distance & interaction   17. 14(3)*** 
χ2, overidentification 13. 73 (10)  18. 67(13) 
First stage equations:     
interaction: R2   0. 3069 
 F, excluded 
instruments 
  2. 72(16)***
entry: R2 0. 3038  0. 3047 
 F, excluded 
instruments 
5. 02(11)***  3. 44(16)***
distance: R2   0. 9326 
 F, excluded 
instruments 
  13. 61(16)***
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
establishment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
number of observations 23,802 23,802 23,802 23,802 23,802 
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Table 2: Negative binomial patent count models 
 Dependent variable: 
number of patentsijt 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
foreign entryjt-1*distancejt-1    -52. 781** -124. 030** 
    (18. 782) (50. 215) 
foreign entryjt-1 22. 038*** 20. 618*** 37. 721*** 27. 917*** 43. 159*** 
 (5. 584) (3. 399) (7. 826) (4. 451) (11. 862) 
distance to frontierjt-1  1. 402** 1. 313** 1. 456** 2. 294*** 
  (0. 614) (0. 635) (0. 588) (0. 315) 
import penetrationjt-1  0. 410** 0. 385* 0. 406* 0. 214 
  (0. 203) (0. 203) (0. 214) (0. 234) 
competitionjt-1  61. 000* 63. 875* 59. 504* 79. 504** 
  (32. 953) (33. 965) (35. 868) (36. 985) 
competitionjt-1 squared  -33. 742* -35. 603* -32. 802 -44. 176** 
  (18. 258) (18. 906) (19. 974) (20. 733) 
patent stocki, pre-sample 0. 004*** 0. 004*** 0. 004*** 0. 004*** 0. 004*** 
 (0. 001) (0. 001) (0. 001) (0. 001) (0. 001) 
D(patent stocki, pre-sample >0) 3. 431*** 3. 498*** 3. 495*** 3. 496*** 3. 408*** 
 (0. 581) (0. 545) (0. 543) (0. 545) (0. 568) 
χ2, exogeneity of…     
entry 10. 11(1)***    
entry, distance & interaction   24. 13(3)*** 
First stage equations:     
interaction: R2    0. 4694 
 F, excluded 
instruments 
   3. 63(25)*** 
entry: R2 0. 3139   0. 4779 
 F, excluded 
instruments 
4. 19(12)***  4. 55(25)*** 
distance: R2   0. 8877 
 F, excluded 
instruments 
  9. 02(25)*** 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
number of observations 1,085 1,085 1,085 1,085 1,085 
Notes: The sample consists of 1,085 observations on incumbent firms listed at the London stock exchange 
between 1987 and 1993. Robust standard errors in brackets and italics are clustered by industry. *** (**, *) 
indicates significance at the 1 (5, 10)-percent significance level. For first stage test results degrees of freedom are 
in brackets. All regressions include a full set of year dummies, 3-digit industry dummies and patent stock 
variables to capture unobservable, time-invariant firm heterogeneity. The variable foreign entry is the lagged 
foreign firm entry rate, distance to frontier is the lagged relative labor productivity measure relating 3-digit US 
to UK industries, import penetration is lagged imports over domestic output, and competition is a lagged rent-
based competition measure. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using ONS and other data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright. 
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Table 3: Robustness of TFP growth and patent count results 
 Dependent variables: 
 growth of total factor productivityijt number of patentsijt 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
foreign entryjt-1*distancejt-1   -9. 400*** -12. 670***  -172. 110*** -125. 212** 
   (2. 189) (4. 029)  (58. 501) (59. 310) 
foreign entry ratejt-1 (EF)   4. 585*** 5. 545***  52. 696*** 41. 699*** 
   (0. 387) (0. 541)  (11. 493) (14. 080) 
foreign entry, near frontierjt-1 2. 593***   79. 489***    
 (0. 429)   (20. 186)    
foreign entry, far frontierjt-1 -0. 961   8. 313    
 (0. 670)   (9. 398)    
domestic entryjt-1*distancejt-1   0. 152   10. 309  
   (0. 451)   (22. 113)  
domestic entryjt-1 (ED)   -0. 115   -3. 741  
   (0. 175)   (6. 562)  
distance to frontierjt-1 (D) 0. 230** 0. 085*** 0. 121** 3. 540*** 2. 188*** 2. 238*** 
 (0. 098) (0. 041) (0. 048) (1. 375) (0. 340) (0. 345) 
F or χ2, exogeneity of …         
E; EF*D; D   13. 73(3)*** 14. 17(3)***  59. 43(3)*** 15. 29(3)*** 
E, near; E, far; D 4. 62(3)**   39. 89(3) ***    
χ2, overidentification 16. 00(12) 19. 02(13) 15. 257(13)     
First stage equations:         
EF*D: R2   0. 3075 0. 3083  0. 4724 0. 4697 
 F, excl. instr.   2. 61(16)*** 2. 70(16)***  2. 41(25)*** 3. 68(25)***
EF R2   0. 3067 0. 3060  0. 4787 0. 4778 
 F, excl. instr.   3. 42(16)*** 3. 42(16)***  3. 41(25)*** 4. 56(25)***
EF, near: R2 0. 3938   0. 4961    
 F, excl. instr. 7. 19(15)***   19. 60(23)***    
EF, far : R2 0. 2626   0. 4561    
 F, excl. instr. 1. 66(15)*   2. 87(23)***    
D:  R² 0. 9015 0. 9401 0. 9297 0. 8308 0. 9190 0. 900 
 F, excl. instr. 12. 08(15)*** 14. 23(16)*** 12. 88(16)*** 15. 86(23)*** 12. 88(25)*** 7. 64(25)***
year dummies, import pe-
etrationjt-1, competitionit-1 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
comp.it-1 squared, 3-digit ind. 
dummies, pat. stocki, pre-sample, 
D(pat. stocki, pre-sample>0) 
   Yes Yes Yes 
establishment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes    
number of observations 23,802 23,802 14,367 1,085 1,085 968 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets and italics are clustered by industry. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1 
(5, 10)-percent significance level. For first stage test results degrees of freedom are in brackets. All regressions include 
control variables for import penetration and competition, a full set of year dummies, establishment fixed effects or 3-digit 
industry dummies and patent stock variables to capture unobservable, time-invariant firm heterogeneity. For sample and 
variable description see the respective notes in Table 1 or 2 and main text. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using ONS and other data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright. 
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Table B.1: Product market policy interventions 
EU Single Market Program (SMP)  Year 
The implementation of the EU SMP began in 1988 and 41 3-digit industries were ex 
ante expected to be strongly or moderately affected by it. The aims of the SMP were to 
bring down EU internal barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital and 
labor by interventions like harmonizing product standards, indirect taxes and border 
controls, removing national requirements and other non-tariff barriers that enable firms 
to segment markets and limit competition, restricting public sector discrimination in 
favor of its own firms, and reducing capital as well as labor costs by permitting free 
flow across countries.1 
 1988 
Monopoly and merger cases 
 
The UK Competition Authority has responsibility for undertaking case-by-case 
investigations of potential mergers or potential monopoly situations in order to 
determine whether the merger or actions of firms in the industry are, or can be 
expected, to operate against the public interest by distorting competition, preventing 
entry, increasing prices or reducing consumers' choice. Where the Commissioners 
conclude that this is the case they can recommend remedial interventions such as 
prohibitions or divestments. We use information on cases where remedial actions were 
recommended and undertaken.2 
 
 Year Industry 
code
(SIC 80)
Opium derivatives  1987 2570
Advertising in rambling magazines  1987 4751
Roof trusses and connector plates  1988 3204
Medical and surgical equipment  1988 3720
Beer and brewing industry  1988, 1990, 
1992 
4270
Defense equipment, electronics industry, telecommunications  1989 3433
Sewing thread and textile industry  1989 4321
Tires  1989 4811
Fertilizers  1990 2513
Razors and shaving equipment  1990 3162
Sugar  1991 4200
Carbonated drinks and soft drinks  1990 4283
Matches, cigarette lighters, smokers requisites  1991 2565
Wool, wool scouring, textile industry  1991 4310
Shoe polish  1992 2599
Dairy products and milk  1992 4130
Cross media promotion of publications  1992 4753
Animal waste, Rendering, Meat  1992 4126
                                                          
1 See the European Commission's White Paper (1985) and Mayes and Hart (1994) for further details on EU 
SMP. The list of 41 3-digit industries that were ex ante expected to be affected by the introduction of the EU 
Single Market can be found in Mayes and Hart (1994, p.53). 
2 See http://www.competition-commission.gov.uk/ for published case reports. Davies et al. (1999) and Clarke et 
al. (1998) provide further analyses of these cases. 
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Privatization cases 
 
The Thatcher government embarked on a large scale privatization program in the early 
1980s which led to the sale of a substantial portion of government owned assets. In 
most cases, these privatization decisions resulted in opening up these and related 
markets to entry by new firms.3 
 
 Year Industry 
code
Ordnance, small arms and ammunition: Royal Ordnance  1987 3290
Car parts: Unipart  1987 3530
Aerospace equipment manufacturing: Rolls Royce  1987 3640
Motor vehicles and engines: Leyland Bus, Leyland Truck, Freight Rover, Rover 
Group. 
 1987, 1988 3510
Shipbuilding: British Shipbuilders  1987, 1988, 
1989 
3610
Iron and steel industry: British Steel  1988 2210
Telecommunication equipment: British Telecom  1991 3441
 
 
Table B.2: Large 4-digit industries by distance to technological frontier 
SIC 80 code Industry description US-UK relative labor 
productivity, 1984-1986
  
Large industries close to the frontier (≤median distance to frontier)  
4310 woolen and worsted industry 0.084
4671 wooden and upholstered furniture 0.049
4510 Footwear 0.111
4725 packaging products of boards 0.118
4751 printing and publishing of newspapers 0.214
4536 woman’s and girl’s light outerwear 0.290
4363 hosiery and other weft knitted goods and fabrics 0.316
3443 radio and electronic capital goods 0.362
3284 refrigerating, heating and ventilating equipment 0.414
2489 ceramic goods 0.426
  
Large industries further behind the frontier (>median distance to frontier) 
3420 basic electrical equipment 0.517
3640 aerospace equipment manufacturing and repairing 0.519
2570 pharmaceutical products 0.585
4196 bread and flour confectionery 0.664
4197 biscuits and crisp-bread 0.664
2551 Paints, varnishes and painters’ filings 0.691
4270 brewing and malting 0.779
4122 bacon curing and meat processing 0.893
3460 domestic-type electric appliances 0.894
3530 motor vehicle parts 0.945
Notes: The industries listed here are the largest UK 4-digit industries in the group of industries close to the 
technological frontier and further behind the frontier. Industry size is measured by employment and the distance 
by labor productivity in 4-digit US relative to UK industries between 1984 and 1986. Calculations are based on 
data for all 1235 industry-year cells in the estimation sample for productivity growth models. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using ONS and other data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright. 
                                                          
3 See PriceWaterhouseCoopers (1998) and Parker (2004) for more information. 
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Table B.3: Entry and distance to the technological frontier 
 Quartiles of the distance to frontier distribution 
 1 (close) 2 3 4 (far) 
 mean (standard deviation) 
# employees in entering foreign firms 33 (227) 38 (157) 23 (69) 38 (184)
foreign entry rate in % 0.10 (0.43) 0.15 (0.51) 0.10 (0.33) 0.14 (0.59)
# entering employees if foreign entry>0 160 (484) 129 (267) 83 (109) 203 (385)
foreign entry rate in % if foreign entry>0 0.48 (0.86) 0.50 (0.85) 0.36 (0.55) 0.72 (1.20)
foreign entrants size 74 (236) 70 (164) 47 (64) 105 (523)
Notes: The table describes how foreign firm entry between 1986 and 1992 varies with the distance of UK 4-digit 
industries to the industry-specific US frontier. Calculations are based on data for all 1,235 industry-year cells in 
the estimation sample for productivity growth models. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using ONS and other data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright. 
 
Table B.4: Descriptive statistics 
 Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation
ARD establishment sample  
 growth of total factor productivityit -0.008 -0.005 0.113
 growth of total factor productivityit, mark-up corrected -0.001 0.009 0.165
 growth of labor productivityit 0.011 0.011 0.136
 foreign firm entry ratejt-1 0.001 0 0.005
 number of employees in new foreign firms/1000jt-1 0.054 0 0.234
 number of employees/1000jt-1 40.326 30.773 32.035
 domestic firm entry ratejt-1 0.025 0.020 0.020
 import penetrationjt-1 0.967 0.932 0.472
 competitionjt-1 0.899 0.909 0.062
 distance to the frontierjt-1, labor productivity-based 0.209 0.203 0.279
 distance to the frontierjt-1, TFP-based 0.091 0.105 0.138
 US capital-labor ratio (real, in million £) 36.127 28.412 31.891
 US skilled real wage in 1000 £ 19.233 19.020 3.460
   
LSE firm sample  
 number of US-patentsit 8.129 0 24.100
 foreign firm entry ratejt-1 0.002 0.0002 0.004
 number of employees in new foreign firms/1000jt-1 0.157 0.021 0.375
 number of employees/1000jt-1 91.722 56.163 76.106
 domestic firm entry ratejt-1 0.022 0.019 0.015
 import penetrationjt-1 1.029 1.088 0.467
 competitionjt-1 0.892 0.903 0.056
 distance to the frontierjt-1, labor productivity-based 0.208 0.230 0.279
 distance to the frontierjt-1, tfp-based 0.082 0.107 0.148
 patent stocki, pre-sample 24.326 1.532 80.743
 D(patent stocki, pre-sample>0) 0.668 1 0.471
 US capital-labor ratio (real, in million £) 39.233 29.299 32.933
 US R&D intensity 0.089 0.094 0.082
 US skilled worker share 0.326 0.307 0.134
Notes: The ARD establishment sample includes 23,802 observations on 4,947 domestic incumbent 
establishments between 1987 and 1993. The LSE firm sample includes 1,085 observations on 176 firms listed at 
the London stock exchange between 1987 and 1993. Industry variables are measured at the 4-digit (3-digit) 
industry level in the ARD establishment (LSE firm) sample except for import penetration and US R&D intensity 
that are at the 2-digit level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using ONS and other data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright. 
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